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Latest post 06-15-2009 7:11 PM by yustaf. 60 replies.
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Try this one,
State v. Pamperien
On June 1, 1995, Officer Pritchard of the Warm Springs Tribal Police Department was patrolling Highway 26 in Jefferson County, within the borders of the Warm Springs reservation. Pritchard observed defendant's vehicle speeding on Highway 26. The officer clocked the vehicle with the radar unit in his patrol car, which indicated that its speed was 75 miles per hour, well above the posted state speed limit of 55. After stopping the vehicle, Pritchard approached and asked the driver for his driver's license. Defendant replied that he did not have an Oregon license and produced an expired tribal driver license. Although defendant is not a member of the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, or of any other tribe, he is married to a Warm Springs tribal member and lives on the reservation.
Pritchard returned to his patrol car and made a radio request for a report on defendant's driving status. That report revealed that defendant's state driver's license was suspended and also that there was an outstanding Wasco County warrant for his arrest for felony driving while suspended. The officer returned to defendant's vehicle, arrested him, and transported him to Warm Springs jail. At the jail, Pritchard issued defendant two tribal citations and also cited him in Jefferson County court for driving while suspended.(1) Before his trial on that charge in Jefferson County court, defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the stop of his vehicle. The court denied that motion, and defendant was subsequently convicted after a jury trial.
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress. We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact so long as there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). We review legal conclusions for errors of law. Id. A trial court may be "right for the wrong reason"; in other words, we may affirm on grounds different from those on which the trial court based its decision, so long as there is evidence in the record to support those alternate grounds. State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611, 628-32, 853 P2d 256 (1993).
Defendant's sole argument is that Pritchard could not lawfully stop him for speeding. Tribal police officers, defendant contends, have no authority under state law to perform traffic stops or to investigate violations of the state traffic code. According to defendant, ORS 810.410, the statutory provision governing traffic stops, only grants authority to perform such stops to "police officers."(2) The term "police officer" is defined in ORS 801.395, which states: "'Police officer' includes a member of the Oregon State Police, a sheriff, a deputy sheriff or a city police officer." Because tribal police officers are not mentioned in that list, defendant argues, they are not authorized to stop drivers for violations of state traffic laws. On that ground, he urges that we must suppress all evidence obtained during Pritchard's stop of defendant, assumedly because Pritchard exceeded his statutory authority by initiating the stop. See, e.g., State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 214, 895 P2d 306 (1995) (evidence obtained by officer who exceeded statutory authority suppressed).
Even if we agreed with defendant's statutory interpretation, his argument would still fail. The authority of tribal police officers to stop drivers for speeding within the borders of the reservation does not derive from ORS 810.410. Rather, it derives from the tribe's inherent power as sovereign to maintain public order on the reservation.
Of course, as the concurrence notes, our usual practice is to review questions of state law before we reach federal questions like tribal sovereignty. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983). However, that methodology presupposes the existence of a potentially dispositive issue of state law. Here, there is no such issue. Regardless of our resolution of defendant's state statutory argument, Pritchard had unquestioned authority under federal law to perform the traffic stop. Accordingly, we would not reverse the trial court based on defendant's state statutory arguments, and we see no benefit in addressing them. To illustrate: If defendant is correct that tribal officers are not "police officers" under ORS 801.395, we still would be required to hold that controlling federal authority made the stop permissible. If defendant is wrong, and tribal officers are "police officers," then the most we could say is that ORS 810.410 provides supplemental authority for a stop already permitted under controlling federal law. Under those circumstances, we believe that the better course is to decline to decide the statutory interpretation question that defendant poses, given that neither possible interpretation could lead us to the result defendant seeks.
Within the borders of their reservations, Indian tribes possess certain inherent sovereign powers, which they "enjoy[] apart from express provision by treaty or statute." Strate v. A-1 Contractors, ___ US ___, 117 S Ct 1404, 1409, 137 L Ed 2d 661 (1997). Those powers are retained attributes of tribes' historic status as "self-governing sovereign political communities." United States v. Wheeler, 435 US 313, 322-23, 98 S Ct 1079, 55 L Ed 2d 303 (1978). While their authority has been significantly diminished, "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependant status." Id. at 323.
Tribal sovereignty is limited; it does not, for example, allow tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191, 212, 98 S Ct 1011, 55 L Ed 2d 209 (1978).(3) However, the more limited power at issue in this case--the power to maintain public order by investigating violations of state law on the reservation--is clearly an incident of general tribal sovereignty. Courts repeatedly have found that tribal officers have inherent authority to do exactly as Pritchard did here, irrespective of any state statutory grant of policing authority. In Duro v. Reina, 495 US 676, 697, 110 S Ct 2053, 109 L Ed 693 (1990), the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[t]ribal law enforcement authorities have the power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities."
The Court reaffirmed that principle in a 1997 decision:
"We do not here question the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a reservation, including rights of way made part of a state highway, and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating state law." Strate, 117 S Ct at 1414 n 11.
The same result also has been reached by other federal and state courts that have confronted the issue before us. See, e.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F 2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir 1975) (recognizing "the authority of a tribal police officer * * * to investigate any on-reservation violations of state and federal law"); State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash 2d 373, 386-87, 850 P2d 1332 (1993) (same); State v. Haskins, 269 Mont 202, 210, 887 P2d 1189 (1994) (same).
We agree with those cases and hold that Pritchard's stop of defendant was proper. Warm Springs tribal law enforcement officers have the authority to investigate on-reservation violations of state and federal law as part of the tribe's inherent power as sovereign(4) and may detain violators and turn them over to the proper officials if jurisdiction to prosecute the offense rests outside the tribe. Accordingly, defendant's argument that Oregon statutes provide no independent authority for tribal officers to make such a stop is beside the point. Tribal sovereign powers exist independent of state statute. While those powers are limited, they repeatedly have been found to provide a basis for the exercise of police authority at issue in this case. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
LANDAU, J., concurring.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that tribal officer Pritchard could not lawfully stop him because ORS 810.410 does not confer such authority on tribal officers. The majority declines to address that state statutory argument and instead disposes of the appeal on federal constitutional grounds not argued by defendant or the state. That method of analysis is contrary to well-settled principles that require a "first things first" approach: first statutory arguments, then constitutional ones, State v. Moylett, 313 Or 540, 545, 836 P2d 1329 (1992) ("All issues should first be addressed on a subconstitutional level"); first state law arguments, then federal ones, State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 264, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) ("[A] practice of deciding federal claims without attention to possibly decisive state issues can create an untenable position for this state's system of discretionary Supreme Court review."). It is also contrary to our practice of addressing only arguments raised by the parties unless the proper construction of relevant statutes requires us to do otherwise. Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997).
The majority's disposition of this case is especially surprising because defendant's argument may be so easily disposed of. Defendant contends that Pritchard lacked authority to effect a traffic stop. According to defendant, under ORS 810.410, only "police officers" have authority to effect a traffic stop, and, under the definition provided in ORS 801.395, that term "includes a member of the Oregon State Police, a sheriff, a deputy sheriff or a city police officer." Defendant reasons that, because tribal officers are not mentioned in the definition, they are not to be regarded as "police officers" who are authorized to conduct traffic stops. Defendant's reasoning is flawed for a simple reason. The statutory definition of "police officer" states a nonexclusive list of what is included within the meaning of the term. ORS 801.395. It does not state the exclusive limits of the term. Defendant's argument thus is predicated on a failure to recognize the difference between statutory definitions that express what terms "mean" and what terms merely "include." See, e.g., Pilgrim v. Clatskanie People's Utility Dist., 149 Or App 234, 238-39, 942 P2d 821, rev den 326 Or 389 (1997); State v. Haynes, 149 Or App 73, 76-77, 942 P2d 295 (1997).
The majority professes reluctance to address the solitary statutory argument that the parties contest because doing so might have constitutional implications, albeit ones not raised by any party. I must confess that I cannot follow the logic of skipping our usual practice of deciding nonconstitutional issues first merely because failing to do so might trigger constitutional issues that were not raised by the parties. It strikes me that the better course is to address the statutory arguments raised by the parties and address any constitutional implications in a case in which parties bring such matters properly before us.
In my view, the majority's decision to resort to federal constitutional principles is unnecessary and inappropriate. I therefore respectfully concur with the result of the majority's decision, but not with its reasoning.
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Even more reading for you
This is what the court said in it's Oliphant v Suquamish case.
"Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Petitioners argued that the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court does not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In separate proceedings, the District Court disagreed *195 with petitioners' argument and denied the petitions. On August 24, 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas corpus in the case of petitioner Oliphant. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007. Petitioner Belgarde's appeal is still pending before the Court of Appeals. [FN5] We granted certiorari, 431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059, to decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that they do not."
Just what I said in my posting, it is teh tribal courts that lack CRIMINAL JURISDICTION over non indians.
This bill clearing requires any and all non indians arrested or cited be cited into state courts, not tribal courts.
More case law to follow
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They have changed their minds and are now endorsing the bill.
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Get over yourself and don't live on a reservation moron.
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How is it that in the United States of America in 2008, we can have "sovereign nations" with their own police forces? Police demanding power over all of us, without accountability or recourse.
Are we not all US citizens? Shouldn't we all follow the same laws, use the same courts and be treated equally? Shouldn't we all pay taxes?
I think it is time to move forward into the 21st century and get over all this special treatment based on race.
I was born here. I think that makes me a NATIVE AMERICAN too!
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Intelligent replies wanted
Illiterate? What in my post implies that I can not read? Also, calling me a moron doesn't exactly qualify as a rebuttal to my opinion. Furthermore, who said I live on a reservation? The tribes continually interfere with lands and land-use OUTSIDE of the reservation. Try putting a dock in on Puget Sound, or a structure anywhere near a salmon-bearing stream. The tribes very often step in and try to block these activities, and are quite successful due to the courts decisions regarding fisheries rights. These lawsuits cost the county and municipalities (read: the taxpayers) and when successful they impact the property owners directly. Yet the tribes seem to have no problem building their own docks and mega-casinos near sensitive areas on their land. They want to have their cake and eat it too. I have a lot of respect for law enforcement officers and the job they do; I believe tribal police officers (most of whom I have seen are non-Indian) are/can be/should be as competent and qualified as any other LEO in the state. However as a matter of principle in light of the tribal governments' hypocrisy, I don't think tribal officers should have any jurisdiction or enforcement powers off tribal land, as this bill appears to allow.
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How is it that in the United States of America in 2008, we can have mini "sovereign nations" with their own police forces? Police demanding power over all of us, with no real accountability or recourse (and our own govt officials handing it to them while they smile all the way to the slot machines!)
Are we not all US citizens? Shouldn't we all follow the same laws, use the same courts and be treated equally? Shouldn't we all pay taxes?
I think it is time to move forward into the 21st century and get over all this special treatment based on race.
I was born here. I think that makes me a NATIVE AMERICAN too!
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Why this IS bad legislation...
The legislature passed this bill prematurely, without having a legal determination by the WA State Attorney General.
They passed this bill knowing that the Kansas Attorney General had previously determined a similar bill in Kansas was against Federal Law.
If our Governor signs this bill into law, it will be only a matter of time before the State is sued in federal court.
The State will lose.
Such a court case will be paid out of OUR pockets.
Priceless.
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Is this the one you are referring to?
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 94-152
The Honorable Don Sallee
State Senator, First District
Rural Route 2
Troy, Kansas 66087
Re:
Criminal Procedure; Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure--Arrest--Jurisdiction
of Certain Law Enforcement Officers; Authority of Tribal Law Enforcement
Officers to Enforce State Law on the Reservation
Synopsis:
Unless deputized or otherwise employed by the county in which the
reservation is located, or some other appropriate state law enforcement
authority, tribal law enforcement officers are not authorized to enforce
state laws within the boundaries of the reservation even upon receiving
certification from the Kansas law enforcement training commission. However,
under the tribe's sovereign authority, and in order to preserve the peace,
tribal law enforcement officers may detain persons who have committed an
unlawful breach of the peace within the boundaries of the reservation and
transport such persons, as far as the reservation border, to the proper
authorities. What constitutes an "unlawful breach of the peace" will depend
on the circumstances and the applicable law. Cited herein: K.S.A. 12-4111;
12-4212; 12-4113; 19-813; 22-2201; K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-2202; K.S.A.
22-2401; 22-2401a; 22-2403; 74-2108; K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 75-4503; K.S.A.
76-726.
* * *
Dear Senator Sallee:
As state senator for a district that encompasses federally recognized Indian
reservations, you request our opinion regarding tribal law enforcement
powers. Specifically, your question is as follows:
"Are tribal law enforcement officers who have received Kansas law
enforcement training center certification authorized to apprehend and arrest
persons for violation of state laws within the boundaries of the reservation
in the absence of being commissioned by the sheriff of the county in which
the reservation is situated or some other appropriate state law enforcement
authority? In other words, do tribal law enforcement officers have the same
law enforcement powers as sheriff's officers when acting within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the reservation?"
The context in which your question arises involves the Kickapoo Nation's
concern with the amount of time that may be required for the county
sheriff's department to respond to potentially volatile situations. The
tribe's law enforcement officers are often able to arrive at the scene more
quickly than a sheriff's officer who may have to travel quite a distance.
The tribe therefore is interested in being able to detain persons who have
violated state laws on the reservation, and to transport such persons to the
custody of the sheriff. It is our understanding that the tribal law
enforcement officers in question have successfully completed the training
required at the state law enforcement training center and have received
certification from the law enforcement training commission. Apparently
tribal law enforcement officers have been admitted to the training center as
reserve sheriff's deputies for Brown county.
K.S.A. 22-2401 sets forth the circumstances under which a "law enforcement
officer" may make an arrest in the state of Kansas. See also K.S.A. 12-4212.
Any person who is not a "law enforcement officer" is subject to the
provisions of K.S.A. 22-2403 when making an arrest under the laws of this
state. As used in these statutes (See K.S.A. 22-2201), the term "law
enforcement officer" is defined as:
"[A]ny person who by virtue of office or public employment is vested by law
with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for violation of the
laws of the state of Kansas or ordinances of any municipality thereof or
with a duty to maintain or assert custody or supervision over persons
accused or convicted of crime, . . . while acting within the scope of their
authority." K.S.A. 22-2202. See also K.S.A. 12-4113.
K.S.A. 19-813 is the state law that vests sheriffs, undersheriffs and
sheriffs' deputies with a duty to maintain public order. K.S.A. 12-4111
vests law enforcement officers employed by Kansas cities with the power to
detain persons, to place them in custody and to arrest them for violation of
municipal ordinances. Highway patrol officers are vested with authority
pursuant to K.S.A. 74-2108, capitol area security officers pursuant to
K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 75-4503 and university police officers are empowered by
K.S.A. 76-726. The law enforcement powers of these various officers are
further defined and limited by the jurisdictional boundaries established in
K.S.A 1993 Supp. 22-2401a. There are no state laws vesting similar authority
in tribal law enforcement officers as such. Neither are we aware of any
federal laws or treaty provisions that would give the tribe authority to
enforce state laws. Therefore, tribal law enforcement officers are not law
enforcement officers within the definition of the Kansas code of criminal
procedure. Such officers would be subject to the provisions of K.S.A.
22-2403 and would be considered private persons when making arrests for
violations of state laws unless they do so pursuant to a proper appointment
by the sheriff of the county in which they are located. This is true
regardless whether the tribal officers have received training at the state
law enforcement training center and are certified by the law enforcement
training commission. While these officers may very well be qualified to
perform law enforcement functions, they have not been statutorily vested
with authority to enforce state laws by virtue of employment with the state
or one of its political subdivisions as listed above unless they are
deputized or otherwise employed by the county sheriff or other appropriate
law enforcement authority.
While tribal law enforcement officers have no law enforcement powers vested
by state law, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, pursuant to
the tribe's retained sovereign powers, "[t]ribal law enforcement authorities
have the power to restrain those who disturb public order on the
reservation, and if necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and
punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise
their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper
authorities." Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 109 L.Ed.2d 693, 711, 110 S.Ct.
2053 (1990). Duro involved a tribe's ability to criminally prosecute a
non-tribal member in tribal court in a situation where neither the state nor
the federal government were exerting jurisdiction. The Court held that the
tribe could not, under its sovereign powers, prosecute non-members, but
indicated that the tribe's power to exclude persons from tribal lands in
order to preserve the peace remained intact unless and until diminished by
federal statute or voluntarily surrendered by the tribe itself. See Brendale
v. Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 106 L.Ed.2d 343, 365, 109 S.Ct.
2994 (1989) (Justice Stevens concurring opinion); New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 619, 103 S.Ct. 2378 (1983). It
therefore appears that the tribe, pursuant to its sovereign powers, may
detain persons who have committed an unlawful breach of the peace within the
boundaries of the reservation, and may transport such persons to the proper
authorities, at least as far as the reservation border. The sheriff's
ability to receive and process a particular person is commensurate with his
ability to receive an individual who has been placed under citizen's arrest.
To determine what constitutes an "unlawful breach of the peace" over which
tribal law enforcement officers have authority, the tribe should consult its
legal counsel and the bureau of Indian affairs.
In conclusion, unless deputized or otherwise employed by the county in which
the reservation is located, or some other appropriate state law enforcement
authority, tribal law enforcement officers are not authorized to enforce
state laws within the boundaries of the reservation even upon receiving
certification from the Kansas law enforcement training commission. However,
under the tribe's sovereign authority, and in order to preserve the peace,
tribal law enforcement officers may detain persons who have committed an
unlawful breach of the peace within the boundaries of the reservation and
transport such persons, as far as the reservation border, to the proper
authorities.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
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Son of a gun!
Seems that those of us who are concerned about the legality of this bill. and the money it will cost the State taxpayers to fund a legal case at the federal level, should email the Governor to insist that the WA State Attorney General give a legal opinion before she signs this unfortunate piece of legislation into law.
I, for one, am tired of paying for frivolous lawsuits.
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I am soooo sorry for our citzens
Washington State has now been taken hostage by special interests. Tribal big money trumps the good citizens of washington state. Sad- Sad Day for Washington.
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Intelligent replies wanted ????
So let me understand what you are saying here.
Here you are sitting down and enjoying lunch with your family somewhere and two tables away is a Police Officer in full uniform who is employed by a Tribal Government also eating lunch, when suddenly a masked gunman runs in and starts shooting people and turns his gun towards you and your family. You would not want the Police Officer to save you family just because he/she does not work for a city or a county.
Or you are driving down the street and come up to a greeen traffic light. As you begin to enter the intersection, a drunk driver runs the red light, almost hitting you and causes you to almost hit a telephone pole. Once you recover and are now stopped, you see a fully marked Police Car being driven by a Police Officer employed by a Tribal Government stopped at the red light that the drunk drive just ran. You are in a city, not within the an Indian Reservation, you do not want him/her to go after the drunk driver and pull them over to make sure they don't kill someone
Is this what you are saying????????????
WOW, well I hope you and/or a family member never have to involved in anything like this.
If it was me and my family and that officer did not do anything, I would file the biggest law suit.
Everyone here is sooo upset about this bill, but really, how many of you are really ever going to have to deal with a Police Officer from a Tribal Government???? If you are not breaking the law, you have nothing to worry about.
The people who have posted about not being able to have a vote or a say in who is elected. If you live in King County, you vote there for County Sheriff and Commissioner. You do not get to have a say in who is the Sheriff of Kitsap, Clark, Lewis County or their Commissioners.
And for all of you have claim “I DO NOT LIVE ON AN INDIAN RESERVATION” Here is what Title 18 U.S.C. gives as “Indian Country”
1151. Indian country defined
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same
Notice the words “All Lands”, so that means your fee simple land to, so you do live on an Indian Reservation. Or the street you are speeding on and have now gotten pulled over by a Police Officer and you are now yelling at him/her that they have no jurisdiction over you. Notice the words “Including rights of way”. So all you people on I5 that got pulled over, why are you complaining that it was a Police Officer from a Tribal Government. Now unless someone held a gun to your head and forced you to live there, then it seems to me, you made a choice to live there and you should not complain. Now if you were forced to live on an Indian Reservation and you are not an Indian, then by all means scream very loud about this.
I would love to see you go to Canada or Mexico and tell the police and courts there, that you are a US citizen and they do not have jurisdiction over you because you do not have a voting voice and see how far that’s gets you. Hows that working out for Amanda Knox?
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Could you send a copy of the document that states that the tribal court will only allow you use an attorney that they approve of. Seriously, I am interested in that - please send to civicnewscorp at comcast.net Thank you
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frivolous lawsuits you say?
Well if you are tired of frivolous lawsuits, maybe you should become more vocal about things such as,
The Tacoma Police Chief shooting and killing his wife then himself.
Or the two King County Sheriff Deputies not doing anything at a 911 hang up where a whole family was killed.
Or the Pierce County Sheriff Deputy arrested stalking and raping a woman.
Or the Pierce County Sheriff Deputy arrested twice in the same night for DUI
Or the Pierce County Sheriff who sat in his patrol car at Lake Tapps while moms and dads helped save a boy who was almost drown in the lake and who told everyone that he is not a life guard. Then said in the investigation that he was mad becuae he was assigned to the Lake for the summer
Or the Poulsbo Police Officer who used police report datebase to stalk women
Or the Kitsap County Sheriff Deputy arredted for having sex with a minor
The list can go on and on and on
What makes people thing that just because a Police Officer has a patch on his uniform from a Tribal Government, he/she will violate someones right 10 time more that a city police officer or a county sheriff?
So if I see Chief Scott Smith from Tulalip Police Department I should run because he now works for a Tribal Governement and somewho when he changed uniforms, part of his brain was eating and he is now a going to violate my rights everytime he see me?
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I love these people posting the “Kansas Attorney Generals Opinion” from 1993 like it has something to do with this law. It doesn’t; not even a little tiny bit. Kansas passed a law similar to the Washington Law in 2004; prior to that, they did not have a law similar to the Washington Law, so the opinion had NOTHING to do with the law that was just passed.
AFTER Kansas passed their law in 2004, here is what happened, and it’s a DIRECT quote from a study published by the U.S. Department of Justice, and the International Association of Chief’s of Police after the Kansas law hav been in place for 2 years:
The Kansas State Senate Bill 9 (SB 9) allows tribal law enforcement officers to
“exercise the powers of law enforcement officers anywhere within the exterior limits of the tribe’s reservation” subject to the following conditions: The tribe must secure liability insurance coverage for damages assessed in state or federal court from acts of the tribal law enforcement agency in amounts specified in the bill. Claims brought against the tribal law enforcement agency must be processed as if the tribe were the state pursuant to the Kansas Tort Claims Act.
?? The tribe must waive its sovereign immunity to the extent necessary to permit
recovery under the liability insurance to cover mutual aid agreements.
If tribal law enforcement officers are requested to assist local or state law
enforcement, the tribal officers are considered to be an officer of the agency being assisted. The tribal agency or officer, is granted the same powers, duties, and immunities of the local or state agency during the period of time in which the tribal law enforcement agency or officer is providing assistance. This power is conferred upon tribal police officers representing the four resident tribes of Kansas: the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas, Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri, and the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska.
Coordination and Collaboration
Kansas Bill SB 9 was passed through the cooperation and collaboration of the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations, Kansas state legislature, and the four resident tribes of Kansas.
Funding
There is no fiscal impact associated with this bill or the powers it confers.
Impact and Outcomes
Kansas Bill SB 9 establishes equality between all Kansas state law enforcement for the purpose of providing mutual aid and providing law enforcement services for all residents of Kansas. As a result of the bill, jurisdictional concerns have been clarified, officer safety has been enhanced, law enforcement agencies can more effectively assist one another using and mutual aid agreements, and liability concerns are put to rest. Leadership by the public safety agencies of the tribes and state, the state legislature and Governor Kathleen Sebelius has improved the cooperative nature of law enforcement professionals in the State of Kansas and enhanced the quality of public
safety by this action.
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This bill is a good thing!
I love these people posting the “Kansas Attorney Generals Opinion” from 1993 like it has something to do with this law. It doesn’t; not even a little tiny bit. Kansas passed a law similar to the Washington Law in 2004; prior to that, they did not have a law similar to the Washington Law, so the opinion had NOTHING to do with the law that was just passed.
AFTER Kansas passed their law in 2004, here is what happened, and it’s a DIRECT quote from a study published by the U.S. Department of Justice, and the International Association of Chief’s of Police:
The Kansas State Senate Bill 9 (SB 9) allows tribal law enforcement officers to
“exercise the powers of law enforcement officers anywhere within the exterior limits of the tribe’s reservation” subject to the following conditions: The tribe must secure liability insurance coverage for damages assessed in state or federal court from acts of the tribal law enforcement agency in amounts specified in the bill. Claims brought against the tribal law enforcement agency must be processed as if the tribe were the state pursuant to the Kansas Tort Claims Act.
?? The tribe must waive its sovereign immunity to the extent necessary to permit
recovery under the liability insurance to cover mutual aid agreements.
If tribal law enforcement officers are requested to assist local or state law
enforcement, the tribal officers are considered to be an officer of the agency being assisted. The tribal agency or officer, is granted the same powers, duties, and immunities of the local or state agency during the period of time in which the tribal law enforcement agency or officer is providing assistance. This power is conferred upon tribal police officers representing the four resident tribes of Kansas: the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas, Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri, and the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska.
Coordination and Collaboration
Kansas Bill SB 9 was passed through the cooperation and collaboration of the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations, Kansas state legislature, and the four resident tribes of Kansas.
Funding
There is no fiscal impact associated with this bill or the powers it confers.
Impact and Outcomes
Kansas Bill SB 9 establishes equality between all Kansas state law enforcement for the purpose of providing mutual aid and providing law enforcement services for all residents of Kansas. As a result of the bill, jurisdictional concerns have been clarified, officer safety has been enhanced, law enforcement agencies can more effectively assist one another using and mutual aid agreements, and liability concerns are put to rest. Leadership by the public safety agencies of the tribes and state, the state legislature and Governor Kathleen Sebelius has improved the cooperative nature of law enforcement professionals in the State of Kansas and enhanced the quality of public
safety by this action.
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The Washington State Sheriff's Assocation
Well, I guess the don't have much power, do they?
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As I read this, the intent was to let the tribal police have the jurisdiction over non-tribal members on the reservations. That is fine. Although if a tribal member commits a crime off the reservation he is not held accountable to our laws and only has to deal with the tribal kangaroo court. They don't hold their own people accountable, talk about a safe haven. Everyone needs to be held to the same standards and laws. On another note, as the reservations are considered sovereign countries what's next, Canada patrolling or state? Our Governor and Legislators have sold us out.
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yustaf


- Joined on 06-15-2009
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Re: 2008 House Bill 2476 (Authorizing tribal police officers to act as general authority Washington state peace officers)
The State acts as a Corporation. The State is only concerned for the "State". Legislature is concerned only for the "State". In 2008 the "States" largest source of income was...federal Bail Out money. This money originated mostly from the sale of Treasury Bonds to the Chinese Communist Government, which now has Emminent Domain, How much land can $5 trillion buy? Bill EHB 2476 (2006) is just another enormous expense, and another example of the "illegal" contracts that compel our performance. Tribal Officers have been pulling over citizens, on or off, the reservation for years. These Casino-parking-lot-security-guards are not competent. They engage in "Impersonating Officers- gross misdemeanors" (prior to 2008); then cost the tax payers $$$$$. Then, other WA Peace Officers have to cover up their "criminal" acts by writing tickets after "hand-off" of citizen. This is an arrest "absent probable cause"; however, some Arlington District Court Judges will also commit more crimes from the bench trying to cover this FACT up. This perpetuates a cycle of enormous waste of tax resources. Now, the judge, off-duty tribal officer, several prosecutors, the district, county, and even the State or now liable for damages upon civil procedures.
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yustaf


- Joined on 06-15-2009
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Re: 2008 House Bill 2476 (Authorizing tribal police officers to act as general authority Washington state peace officers)
If you are "cited" by a Tribal Officer (federal issue) then:
The criminal defendant should submit a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request immediately, for such things as any regulations which have been published in the Federal Register, pursuant to the Federal Register Act, for 18 U.S.C. 3231.
See "Karma and the Federal Courts" by Paul Andrew Mitchell
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